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Question Two. Whether Remission or Expulsion of Guilt and Infusion of Grace are One Simple Change
32. Second I ask whether remission or expulsion of guilt and infusion of grace are one simple change.
33. That they are not:
[Ps.-]Augustine, On True and False Penitence ch.14 n.29 (and it is in Lombard’s text, Sent. IV d.16 ch.2 n.1), “The sinner must grieve not only because he has sinned but because he has deprived himself of virtue.” From this follows that to sin is not formally to deprive oneself of virtue and that to sin is not formally privation of virtue; but infusion of grace, if it is formally the expulsion of some privation, is only the expulsion of its own privation; therefore, it is not itself the expulsion of the fault. Therefore, privation of virtue and the fault are different matter for grief; therefore, by opposition, expulsion of guilt and restitution of virtue are different matter for joy.
34. Further, in morals the corruption of vice is a different change from the introducing of virtue; therefore, similarly here.
35. Proof of the antecedent: Vice is a certain positive quality, just as timidity and stinginess are; for not everyone lacking fortitude is timid but he who has the habit that inclines to being timid; nor is everyone lacking liberality stingy, but he who has acquired the habit from frequently acting stingily. This appears by induction also in the vices, that the extremes incline the powers to acts conform to themselves, just as the means incline to acts conform to themselves; and this inclination is not by privation alone. But now, when there are two opposed positive forms, one of which succeeds to the other, the changes are different because there are four terms, as is plain in the case of alterations from contrary to contrary [e.g. from black to white, and from white to black]. Further, generation and corruption are two changes because of the four terms, namely two privations and two forms [e.g. from non-black to black and from non-white to white].
Here there is the corruption of the sin that was present and a certain generation in gratuitous being when grace is infused; therefore, two changes.
36. Further, the disposition and that for which it disposes are not the same; the expulsion of sin disposes to infusion of grace. The proof is that by expulsion of guilt one is not an enemy, and by infusion of grace one is a friend, but not being an enemy disposes one to being a friend. And from this could the main argument be made: that ‘to cease to be an enemy’ is not the same as ‘to begin to be a friend’; but by expulsion of guilt one ceases to be an enemy, and by infusion of grace one begins to be a friend; 
therefore etc 
.
37. On the contrary:
If expulsion of guilt is a change different from infusion of grace, it will then be either a positive change or a privative one; or, as others say [Scotus, Ord. IV d.10 nn.44-50], it will be either a change acquiring, or a change losing, something. Not a change that acquires something, because the term ‘to which’ of a positive change is something positive, while of the expulsion there is no positive term ‘to which’ other than grace. Nor is it a privative change, because then the term ‘from which’ would be positive, but guilt is not anything positive; therefore etc .
38. Again, if this and that change are different, they will have between them some order of prior and posterior, because they are ordered to the same end, and not equally so because they do not equally immediately attain the end; but no order can there be posited; therefore etc . The proof of the minor is because, if expulsion were prior in nature, then this person would be a friend in the prior expulsion and yet not a friend, because not possessing the grace without which no one is a friend; for if infusion of grace were prior, he would be a friend in the prior stage because possessing grace, and yet an enemy at the same time because still possessing guilt.
I. To the Question
A. A possible Solution
1. First Conclusion
39. Let the first conclusion, then, be this, that the infusion of grace and expulsion of guilt (or more properly the remission of guilt) are not simply one change.
40. The proof of this is fourfold:
First as follows: the simply same thing cannot be multiplied and not multiplied, and this when taking ‘the same’ and ‘multiplied’ uniformly (namely, if really then really, if in reason then in reason); for this includes the opposite of the first principle [sc. the principle of non-contradiction], that the same thing, as the same thing, is one and is not one. But remissions of fault are many (in the way that someone is said to be a sinner after an act of sin that passes, and is said, after he has committed many sins, to be a sinner with many faults). And each of these faults has its own remission, because each remission could be without any other if the sinner had committed only that fault and not any other.
41. Again, second as follows: the same thing is not separate from the same thing, taking identity and separation uniformly (namely, if really then really, if in reason then in reason); for this includes the opposite of the first principle, namely that the same thing, as it is the same, is and is not at the same time. But remission of guilt and infusion of grace can be separated, which is plain both by comparing the first with the second and conversely. For, in the state of innocence in the human race, it were possible (as it was in fact in the angels who did not sin) for grace to be infused without remission of any guilt, because there was no guilt present. Likewise, guilt can be remitted without grace being infused. Proof: God can, of his absolute power, create man in a purely natural state, without fault and without grace; therefore, also after the Fall he can repair such a man and remit guilt without infusion of grace. The evidence for this reasoning is plain above, in d.1, the question on circumcision [Ord. IV d.1 nn.343-345, 357].
42. Third as follows: guilt and grace are not formally opposed nor formally repugnant. Proof: because then an agent that can, by effecting or failing to effect, have power over the being of one, could, by effecting or failing to effect, have power over the non-being of the other, as is plain universally about incompossibilities. But the created will has, by effecting or failing to effect, power over the being of guilt, because the guilt is from itself. Therefore , it could, by effecting or failing to effect, have power over the nonbeing of grace, which is false, because grace is not destroyed unless it be annihilated, and a creature is not able to annihilate anything. The first proposition [here supra] is therefore plain, namely that ‘there is no formal repugnance between guilt and grace’. But there is no single change from a thing as from the term ‘from which’ to another thing as to the term ‘to which’ unless they are formally repugnant; therefore etc .
43. Fourth as follows: there is no single change to a positive form save from the proper privation of that form; guilt, as that by which a sinner, after the act, is called a sinner, is not the proper privation of grace, because a single grace has only a single privation, and there are many faults in this way, as was said in the first reason [n.40]. Nor is it valid to object, against the major, that some change has both terms positive, for of this change (which is to grace) the per se term ‘from which’ is privation, and consequently it is the proper privation of the term ‘to which’.
2. The Second Conclusion
44. The second conclusion is this: the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt are a real two changes.40
45. This is plain, because the infusion of grace is a real change, since it is between privation of the real form and the real form; but remission of guilt is not a real change; therefore etc .
46. The major of this reason has been proved [n.45], and is plain from the fact that there is one real change here.
47. The minor needs proof:
Here one must understand that if actual sin were posited to be the corruption or privation formally of some degree of nature, or of natural rectitude, or of some proper positive state or other, then the expulsion of guilt would be the restitution of the positive state that guilt was the privation of; and then the expulsion of guilt could be a real and positive change, from the privation of this rectitude to this rectitude.
48. But this was rejected in Ord. II dd.34-37 nn.36-40, 46, because intellectual nature cannot be corrupted through any action of itself; and just as the whole of nature is incorruptible so also is any degree of it, because if one degree could be corrupted by nature itself through an action of itself, the result would be that the whole could be corrupted by actions of itself repeated several times. Hence as was said there [ibid. supra], the remark of Augustine in Enchiridion [cited by Scotus in Lectura II dd.34-37 n.36], “sin is bad to the extent of the good it takes away,” must be understood to mean, not that it takes away from the goodness of nature in its primary being [sc. substantial being], because the failing of a contingent effect is not repugnant to the cause, since neither is it repugnant to the contingent effect to which it would seem to be more repugnant;41 but it must be understood to mean ‘to take away good in second act,’ not a good, to be sure, that is present, but a good that ought to be present.
49. Therefore if it were posited that some stain, proper to actual sin, were to remain in the soul and that it were expelled by penitence, then remission of guilt could be posited to be a real change away from that guilt to the lack of it. But this was rejected above in distinction 14, question 1, first article [nn.17-20, 34], where it was shown that after the past guilty action, interior and exterior, there remains, besides habitual injustice (which is lack of grace and single in a single soul), no proper actual injustice by which one may be called a sinner by such a sin. For the soul is not receptive immediately of the wrongness that is of a nature to exist in actual sin, but is so only through the medium of the proximate act in which that wrongness is. Therefore, after the past act, the soul remains obligated only to the proper penalty corresponding to the fault committed; and so this obligation is called ‘being guilty’, which remains in the soul after the passing of the intrinsic and extrinsic act.
50. And from this can the minor be proved of the reason accepted before [nn.45, 49, taken from d.14], as follows:
Obligation to a penalty for a fault committed is not anything real in the soul after the past act, but is only a relation of reason in the willed object as willed; therefore, turning away from this relation of reason, which is from this obligation to non-obligation, is not any real change.
51. The consequence is plain, because a change is not real unless it is to a real positive term or a real privative term.
52. The antecedent is plain because, just as what is willed by me has, from the fact that it is willed by me, no new real form, absolute or relative, but only a relation of reason corresponding to the real volition in me - so by the fact that someone, after he has committed a fault, is willed or ordained to a penalty by the divine will, then, since the fault not remain as either any real positive or privative thing, neither is any real relation going to remain founded on the fault, but only a relation of reason; and this, taking relation of reason indifferently for an object willed just as for an object understood (the way contained in Ord. I distinction 45 question 1 nn.7-110), because the comparing of an object willed through an act of will to something else is no more real than the comparing of an object understood through an act of intellect to something else.
B. Weighing of the Aforesaid Possible Solution
53. Against this: no passage from contradictory to contradictory is without some change; but when to this person fault is remitted, it is such a passage; therefore etc . - The major is plain because, if there is no change, there is no reason why one part of the contradiction is more now true than the other and why the other was true before this one is. And this proof can be taken to a further deduction, that such passage cannot be without real change; because a change of reason must be reduced to some real change. The proof of the minor is that this man, before fault is remitted, is ordained to penalty and is deserving of penalty; but when guilt is remitted he is neither ordained to penalty nor deserving of penalty.
54. There is a confirmation, because before remission the divine intellect knows that he is to be deservedly punished; therefore this known thing is true; after remission the divine intellect knows he is not to be punished; therefore this too is true; therefore there is a passage; therefore etc .
55. And it can be argued further, from the proved conclusion [n.53], that, since this change is not in the divine will nor in its act, therefore it will be in him to whom guilt is remitted; and consequently remission of guilt in this person is, according to its proper idea, some change.
C. Scotus’ own Response
56. I reply. Here one needs to see something first about a created will, and afterwards to apply it to the issue in hand.
1. About a Created Will
57. A created will, though it cannot simultaneously will the affirmation and negation of the same thing for the same time, yet it can non-simultaneously will affirmation and negation of the same thing for the same time, namely through diverse acts succeeding each other in turn. And it can simultaneously will affirmation and negation of the same thing for the non-same time, and it can will this of a same thing that has in no way varied in itself before the term of the volition - the fact is plain, if the will considered the same thing for diverse ‘nows’ and willed opposites to belong to it for those diverse ‘nows’.
58. But it is not necessary either that that of which it wills the affirmation and negation for diverse ‘nows’ vary because of that volition, unless the volition be the sufficient cause of the opposites, and thus be an absolute, not a conditioned, volition. For if it could not be the cause of these opposites - namely if both cannot be caused from the outside, because they are only beings of reason, as when I will for this person ownership or something of the sort that is not really causable in him; or if what is willed for him is causable but not by this will, as that I will beatitude for him, which is something really causable in him, but not by my will; also, if it is causable in him, and causable by my will commanding this causable thing, I might will it for him only conditionally for time a and the opposite conditionally for time b - if so, there is no necessity that this opposite be present at time a nor the other at time b, unless the condition were to exist for either of them, or for one of them.
2. About the Divine Will
59. As to the issue at hand [I say] that all objects whatever (with the exception of sins and things willed in generally disordered way) that can be willed by a created will for the same ‘now’ or for different ‘nows’ (and this either in one or in diverse acts) - all these the divine will can in a single act, with one volition really but in idea diverse, will for the same person for the same ‘nows’. For that a will is limited to certain secondary objects precisely (such that it have no power for other objects) is a mark of imperfection in the will. And consequently, the divine will can will, for diverse instants, affirmation and negation for this person, who is in no way varied in himself before an act of volition. And the divine will can do this more than the created will can, because something eternal depends less on something temporal than a temporal act depends on something temporal; rather, it does not depend.
60. If the affirmation and negation, wherewith that will [sc. divine will] wills for this person (who is unvaried in himself) one thing for time a and another thing for time b, are causable simply, it follows that they are causable by the divine will; because the divine will is simply omnipotent. But if they are not causable, or if that will either wills only one of them or wills both conditionally, it follows that that will wills for this person one opposite for a and another for b, and without any change of itself (whether in itself or in its act), and without any change of object, as the object is object; because both volition and object, as it is object for the will, have being in eternity, and an object, as it is an object for act, could not vary without variation of act.
61. And from this follows that the divine will can will affirmation (let it be called c) for this person for instant a, and negation (let it be called d) for the same person for instant b, without any change either in the divine will or in the object, as it is object, or in anything extrinsic, and this if between those opposites change by nature does not occur (because, clearly, either the affirmation is only one of reason, and so the negation is only negation of a being of reason, or the will does not will them, both or one, save conditionally).
62. But because there is no new being of reason save through a new act of intellect or will, that condition (namely about being of reason [n.61]) does not preserve a passage from contradictory to contradictory without change - although the change is not a change between things that are beings of reason but between act and non-act. So, because of the divine will’s omnipotence, in no way can it will c instead of a for this person, and d instead of b, without some change in this person, and this if it will them with efficacious and absolute will. But if it will both or one of them conditionally and the condition does not exist, then a change too is not required. But a created will, because it is not omnipotent, can will absolutely for the same non-varied person c instead of a and d instead of b, and without any change preceding or following.
63. To the form, then of the reasoning,42 I concede the major, taking change properly. But the minor in this way I deny, because the divine will, for the instant at which this man sins and for the whole time gone through up to instant b, wills him to be punished, not insofar as ‘to be punished’ is a participle of future time but insofar as it is a name, that is, he wills this person to be deserving of punishment - which is nothing other save to will to punish this person for the time then, and this with conditioned will, namely if it go on to the end [sc. if the person persists in sin until death]. But if at instant b he repent, God wills him for that time then, and for the whole time gone through up to the instant of a new sin, not to be punished - which is to will him conditionally to be punished if it go on to the end.
64. There is here, then, no passage from one opposite to the other, but there is about the same object here a conditioned willing of the affirmation for one instant and a conditioned willing of the negation for the other instant; and these two ‘willings’ stand together in eternity, and about the same object willed in eternity, although not for eternity, but for different ‘nows’.
65. And hereby is plain the answer to the proof about the divine intellect [n.54], which knows this person to be deserving of penalty before remission and not to be deserving after remission; for this is not other than to know this person to have been ordained to a penalty through an act conditioned for this instant for which he is so ordained, and not to have been ordained for that instant for which he is not so ordained.
3. Objections and their Solution
66. If you argue that every manner of simultaneity is incompossible, because then God would will opposites at the same time and for the same time, therefore some succession, and so a change, is necessarily there required - I reply: succession of an act to an act is not required, nor succession of an act as it extends over an object to an act is it extends over another object, because in eternity it extends over both. But neither is a succession of one object to another in external reality required, because the existence of an external reality is not required for that volition, just as neither is the temporal required for the eternal; but there is required some succession there of things that are objects in objective existence.
67. Nor is ‘to have an order thus [sc. as objects in objective existence]’ the same as ‘to have order in being an object’, for a prior as prior and a posterior as posterior can be understood simultaneously, such that they do not have an order in being an object for the intellect; and yet there is an order to them as they are objects, namely in their objective being. And from this order of objects in objective being no change follows, because an opposite does not succeed to an opposite either in being known or in being [opposite].
68. If you argue against this that there still stands a difficulty in the reasoning, because first one part of the contradiction is true, namely ‘this person is ordained to a penalty’, and second the other part is true, namely ‘this person is not ordained to a penalty’; but there is no passage from contradictory to contradictory without a change; therefore etc . - I reply:
In eternity this proposition is true, ‘this person is for time a ordained to a penalty’, and this one is true, ‘this person is for time b not ordained to a penalty’. And there contradictories are not true at the same time, nor do they succeed each other in truth; but the things for which the affirmation and negation are designated as holding are apprehended as succeeding each other really or possibly.
Or in another way: that ‘this person is now ordained to a penalty’ is nothing other than ‘this person is willed for a penalty at time a, if at that time he is going to be judged’, and ‘this person is later not ordained to a penalty, that is, this person is not willed for a penalty at time b, if at that time he is going to be judged’ - and these are not contradictory.
But that each volition, pertaining to retention and remission of guilt, is only a conditioned volition is plain, because if God wanted absolutely to punish the sinner immediately he had sinned he would immediately punish him.
69. Against this whole process about diverse ‘nows’ for which there is offense and remission: because to an angel existing in the aevum43 who sins God could remit the offense outside all time; and then there would be no possibility of granting such diverse ‘nows’ for which there would be fault and remission, especially if the aevum is posited as indivisible. If it be said that then there would be a different aevum for the fault, and that it would then cease to be when remission arrives - on the contrary: one or other of these two, either the fault or the remission, is a privation only, and so does not have its own aevum. Also, in reference to the aevum when an angel is first abiding in fault and afterwards in remission, these two opposites would be existing in the same aevum and for the same aevum.
70. Let the response to this be looked for in Ordo II d.2 nn.48-79, about ‘Succession in the Aevum’.
71. But suppose God does remit guilt in this way after the offense, without any change in the act or in the object as it is object or in the object as it exists outside - ix there not to this act of remission in Peter (to whom remission is made) some change of reason outside that corresponds?
72. It seems that there is, otherwise Peter is no more absolved or reconciled after remission than before. But if there is something that corresponds, a question about it will arise, whether it is the same as the giving of grace or something other.
73. It can be said that when an act, wherein the object has being of reason, can be the term of a real change, the object can there change with a change of reason (just as a stone can become understood by me from being non-understood, because there could be a new intellection of it). But when the act is in no way the term of a real change, the object in the act there cannot change with a change of reason. Of this sort is divine willing, and consequently Peter, as he is the object of this act because having, as outside, new being, does not have the idea of being recently an object but of being so uniformly in eternity. And so change, whether of thing or of reason, does not seem it needs to be posited in Peter when his fault is said to have been remitted to him.
74. Concomitant there, however, with this remission, active from God and passive in Peter, is a certain real change - and this always of God’s ordained power, which is for the giving of grace to Peter, because God does not, of his ordained power, God give remission to anyone for time a without for that time giving him grace. But of God’s absolute power, both in the thing outside and in the act inside, these two could for eternity be separated, namely so that he would give remission to Peter at time a when a comes (which is only an imminent act in God) and yet not give grace to him in a when some outside act comes and goes - if in eternity he wanted to give remission for time a when a comes, and yet not did not want in eternity to give him grace for time a; for the first states only negation of a positive act, which is ‘to will to punish’, but the second states a positive different act.
75. And if you argue that Peter cannot be differently disposed to the divine will (as punitive will or non-punitive) save because he is differently disposed in some other respect, namely, because he is accepted or not accepted; for an object not in itself varied according to any other thing actually prior is not an object in a different way for divine volition- this is false, because our will too can in some act be differently disposed to an object that, even before the act, is disposed uniformly; and it could do so if it always had the same act contingently passing over secondary objects.44
II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Side
76. To the first main argument [n.33], I concede that sin is not formally the privation of grace, as some arguments proceeded for the first conclusion [nn.41-43]; and from this I concede that the introducing of grace or of any virtue is not formally the expulsion of guilt.
77. But if you wish to prove from the authority [n.33] that there are two changes, infusion and expulsion, and thereby that sinning and the corrupting of grace are two changes, therefore, by similarity, in the issue at hand - I reply: the consequence is not valid, because this fault, toward which is the motion of sinning, does not remain up to the infusion of grace, nor could it be the term ‘from which’ of change proper. But when the fault passes, there remains in the person only the obligation as it is the secondary object of the divine will; and in the justification there cannot be a term ‘from which’ of any change proper.
78. To the second [nn.34] it is plain why there are two changes there in morals, because there are four terms there: two real positive ones and two real privative ones. It is not so here, as is plain. The same is plain as to the point about generation and corruption [n.35].
79. To the last argument [n.36] about the disposition for the form for which it disposes, I say that this passive remission, which is the lack of obligation to a penalty, is not a real disposition for friendship or grace; and so this remission, taken as having its term in this lack [sc. of obligation], is not a real change. Therefore, if you take it that the remission-change is a disposition for the change that is infusion of grace, I deny it; because remission is not a change, neither active nor passive, neither real nor of reason.
III. To the Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion
80. From the same point could response be made to the four reasons for the first conclusion in the solution of the question [nn.40-43] if, however, they are extended by anyone to proving there are two changes - which was also denied in the second conclusion [n.44].
81. For the major of the first reason [n.40], if it is taken like this ‘whatever is multiplied in its entity as such a quality is different really from that which is not multiplied in its entity’, is false unless it be a real being; and therefore if the remissions are multiplied in the sort of quality in which they are beings (because they are only remissions of reason), and if the infusion of grace is one, it does not follow that the former are different changes from it; but it does well follow that they are not the same as it, because, universally, what is multiplied in its entity as such a quality is not the same as what is not multiplied, taking the multiplication to be similar on this side and on that.
82. Likewise, the major of the second reason [n.41], ‘whatever is separated from another in its being is really different from it’, is false unless it is in its being a real being.
83. The third reason and the fourth [nn.42-43] do not prove these to be two changes, but only that the change that is to grace does not have guilt for its per se term ‘from which’, which I concede.
IV. To the Initial Arguments for the Other Side
84. To the initial arguments for the opposite.
To the first [n.37] I say that, just as guiltiness or obligation to a penalty (which alone remains after the passing of the act, interior and exterior, in a sin) is a being, because it is a being of reason and so a positive being, consequently too non-guiltiness or non-obligation or non-debt is a privation of a being of reason. And thus, if there were anywhere a passage of reason from obligation to non-obligation, it would be a privative or corruptive change of reason. But it would not anywhere be either in an act of the divine will, or in an object as it is object, or in an object as it exists outside - unless it be said that, to the extent it is in the object outside, to that extent the object is in the ‘now’ for which the act of the divine will regards the object. And then, for the object outside to pass from ‘not being in that now’ to ‘being in that now’ is for it to change concomitantly with a change of reason from ‘being obligated’ to ‘not being obligated’. When therefore you argue that there is no corruptive change, because its term ‘from which’ is not anything positive, I deny it. Nor yet is a fault anything positive, nor does it remain, but the obligation that follows the commission of a fault is something positive and it remains.
85. The second argument [n.38], about prior and posterior, is something pondered in this matter by others, because when positing a distinction between these changes they seek for an order between them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.17 q.1 a.4; Richard of Middleton Sent. IV d17 princ.4 q.4].
86. I say briefly, then, that according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics ‘On the Prior’ [5.11.1019a2-14 and 9.8.1049b17-21, 9.1050a4-7], some things are prior in generation, others in perfection. And these priorities are commonly disposed to each other conversely, for the more imperfect things are prior by way of generation. I say in this manner that if the expulsion of guilt were some being, and the infusion of grace likewise, the expulsion of guilt would be prior by way of generation; but, conversely, the infusion of grace would be prior by way of perfection, because it is more immediate to the end, which is what is simply perfect in this order. Similarly in the case of priority of consequence it is plain that the more imperfect is prior, just as animal according to consequence is prior to man, and universally the consequent is more imperfect than the antecedent.45 So, in the way in which there would be a consequence between them, expulsion would follow on infusion, not conversely, for they are not immediate opposites simply by nature of being extremes, but by divine institution. But the introduction of one does not follow on the removal of the other save in the case of opposites immediate in themselves.46
87. But whether the expulsion of guilt follows on grace is doubtful, since they are not formally opposed, as was proved in the third argument and the first conclusion of the solution [n.42].
88. But one could say, denying this [n.87], that to be a friend to God and an enemy to him is a contradiction: by grace one is a friend, by guilt one is an enemy; therefore etc .47
89. But this is not cogent, because ‘friendship through grace’ means to be ordained to life eternal, ‘enmity through guilt’ means to be ordained to a fitting penalty; these can stand together, though not for the same ‘now’. At any rate, in whatever way they are opposites, there seems to be a formal consequence from ‘grace is present’ to ‘guilt is not present’ rather than conversely, because in the second case the antecedent in no way entails the consequent.48
90. But if a question is asked about the priority of causality between them, I reply: the question does not arise. For neither is the negation of obligation (which is only a negation of a being of reason) a cause of grace nor conversely, because the divine will alone by its own justice determines the obligation, or determines by its mercy nonobligation.
91. And if you ask what order these have (grace and guilt) as they are secondary objects of the divine will - I reply as was said in Ord. I d.41 nn.40-42, ‘On Predestination’: in the way in which there is an order of divine volition in relation to secondary objects, God first wills what is nearer to the end; and so for this person for time a, namely after he has sinned, God wills grace simply first rather than not to exact vengeance, speaking of priority of intention. But just as he wills the execution to be converse to the intention (and therefore he wills this person to have merits before grace, and through merits glory), so he wills that in the order of nature guilt not be present in this person before grace is present.
92. Or if it be said that by ‘present’ and ‘not present’ nothing is posited in this person externally but only as he is object of divine volition, one can in consequence say that these secondary objects have a certain order according to perfection as the divine will tends toward them, but that according to causality and generation they have no order, etc.